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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 In 2010, Karen Capato filed an appeal challenging the District Court’s decision 
affirming the denial of social security benefits to her twin children (the “twins”) 
following the death of her husband, Robert Nicholas Capato (“Nick”).  We vacated the 
District Court’s determination in part, but the Supreme Court reversed our decision and 
remanded the case for further review.  We will now affirm the District Court’s decision. 
I. 
 The factual and procedural history of this case was recounted in detail by the 
Supreme Court in its recent opinion remanding this case to our Court.  See Astrue v. 
Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025-27 (2012).  The Supreme Court instructed 
that “the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of Karen Capato’s application for [the 
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twins’] insurance benefits by reference to state intestacy law.”1  Id. at 2034.  Thus, we 
will address two questions.  First, we must determine which state’s law to apply.  Second, 
we must decide whether that state’s intestacy law would allow the twins to receive 
benefits.   
II.
2
 
A. 
 To determine which state’s law applies, we ask where Nick was domiciled at the 
time of his death.  The Government argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and 
District Court were correct to conclude that Nick was domiciled in Florida, where he 
lived for about three years immediately preceding his death.  Capato argues that Nick was 
domiciled in Washington, the state where he was born and lived the majority of his life.  
Our decision turns on whether the ALJ’s decision was “supported by substantial 
evidence.”  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).   
  “[D]omicile is established by an objective physical presence in the state or 
territory coupled with a subjective intention to remain there indefinitely.”  Washington v. 
Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011).  Intent to remain must be analyzed at 
the time of arrival in a new place:  if a person is shown to have doubts about remaining in 
a new location after his arrival, those doubts are not relevant unless they indicate there 
                                              
1
 Under the law, a person is entitled to benefits if he or she is a “child” as defined by 42 
U.S.C. § 416(e).  See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).  
2
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the District Court was granted 
jurisdiction by 42 U.S.C. 405(g). 
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was never an original intent to stay.  Gallagher v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 185 F.2d 543, 
546 (3d Cir. 1950). 
 There was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to conclude Nick was domiciled in 
Florida.  Nick’s business interests in Florida and the fact that his will was written under 
Florida law provide some indication of his intent, and his actual residence in Florida was 
prima facie evidence that Florida was his domicile.  See Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 
1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972).  And while all the testimony concerning the Capatos’ intent to 
move to New Jersey was credited, the ALJ was free to decide that that evidence did not 
establish that Nick had a definite plan to leave Florida at the time he arrived from 
Colorado. 
B. 
 Because Nick was domiciled in Florida at the time of his death, we must “apply 
such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property 
by the courts of” Florida.  42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).  Under Florida intestacy law, “[a] 
child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the 
transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible for a 
claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the 
decedent’s will.”  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17(4).  Capato’s arguments to the contrary 
notwithstanding, § 742.17(4) clearly prevents recovery for the twins.  
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the twins are 
not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act.   
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, concurring.  
The results we reach in this case – that there is substantial evidence supporting the 
determination that Nick Capato was domiciled in Florida at the time of his passing, and 
that, as a consequence of this determination, the children of Nick and Karen Capato 
conceived after his passing are not entitled to Social Security survivor’s benefits  – are 
correct legally, and so I must concur.   But the denial of survivor’s benefits to Nick and 
Karen Capato’s twins strikes me as grossly unfair.   
 The manifest unfairness of this case is the unfortunate consequence of legislation 
that was enacted generations before scientific and technological advances made it 
possible for couples like the Capatos to provide for a family even in the tragic 
circumstance of a death-sentence diagnosis of the wage earner.  In 1939, when Congress 
first enacted legislation to provide for survivor benefits to the children of a wage earner, 
Congress was compelled to address the issue of who in fact was a child of the deceased 
wage earner for children born outside of wedlock when paternity and parentage status 
was not ascertainable with certainty.  This concern for providing survivor benefits to 
children conceived and born outside a traditional marriage remained the focus of 
congressional attention in the 1960s, when section 216(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 416(h), was last amended by “extending benefits to the children of unwed 
parents.”  Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 67 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting).  As 
explained in McMillian ex rel. McMillian v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1985): 
Until 1965, § 416(h)(2) provided the sole means by which illegitimates 
could establish entitlement to benefits as dependent children, with § 
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(h)(2)(A) the primary vehicle.  Under that provision, an illegitimate 
claimant could establish entitlement to benefits by proving his entitlement 
to inherit from the insured wage earner as a “child” under the intestate 
succession law of the state of the insured’s domicile.  In 1965, § (h)(3)(C) 
was added specifically to provide other means by which entitlement might 
be established.  
Under the state inheritance law provisions of § 416(h)(2)(A), a claimant 
born in wedlock who sought to establish entitlement to benefits as the 
illegitimate child of another than his mother’s husband was and is perforce 
confronted with any presumption of in-wedlock parentage integral to the 
state’s inheritance law.  That element of state law is necessarily included in 
the general congressional incorporation of state inheritance law into § 
416(h)(2)(A). 
But when § 416(h)(3)(C) was added in 1965 to provide supplementary and 
alternative means of proving entitlement by illegitimates, it did not 
expressly or by implication incorporate any element of state law respecting 
parentage, inheritance rights or any other matter of possible relevance to 
dependent child status. So far as the text of § 416(h)(3)(C) is concerned, all 
questions of its interpretation and application are referable solely to federal 
law. 
 
Id. at 1152 (citations omitted). 
 
Thus, the combination of sections 416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C) assure that any child of 
a deceased wage earner born outside a traditional marriage while the wage earner is 
living has an opportunity, under a nationwide system,  to receive benefits that are 
intended to “replace the support that the child would have received from [the deceased 
parent] had the [parent] not died.”  Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater, 101 F.3d 509, 514 (7th 
Cir. 1996).   Such children are entitled to survivor benefits either if they qualify as heirs 
of the deceased parent under the intestate laws of the state where the parent was 
domiciled at the time of his or her death, see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), or, if not so 
qualified, by satisfying one of several nationally-applicable criteria.  See id. § 
416(h)(3)(C).   
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 Children conceived after the death of a parent, a consequence of scientific 
advances “not within the imagination, much less contemplation, of Congress when the 
relevant [legislative provisions] came to be,” Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Social 
Security, 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012), however, are 
relegated to the intestacy laws of the several states.  Unlike “out-of-wedlock” children 
born before the death of the deceased wage earner, “after-conceived” children have no 
alternative way to establish entitlement to survivor benefits.  This means that some after-
conceived children will receive survivor benefits because their parents were domiciled in 
states that recognize after-conceived children as heirs of their parents under their intestate 
laws, while others will be denied benefits solely because the intestate laws of the state 
where the wage earner passed away did not recognize his or her after-conceived children 
as heirs.  And so we have a nationwide benefits program in which some after-conceived 
children of wage earners are treated as the children of their biological parents, while other 
after-conceived children are not regarded as the children of their biological parents. This 
strikes me as manifestly unfair. 
 Nick Capato was a fully-insured individual in a nationwide system that provides 
benefits to the children of fully-insured individuals.  His offspring, whether conceived 
before or after his passing, should be entitled to the same treatment for survivor benefits 
that every other child born in the United States receives.  There is no dispute that Nick 
Capato desired to provide for a family notwithstanding being stricken by a fatal disease.  
As it turned out, he was living in the wrong state when he died to assure that his after-
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conceived children would receive the benefits of a national program into which he paid 
his fair share.   
Where, as here, the record is clear as to the relationship between the claimant and 
the wage earner, eligibility for benefits in a nationwide program should not turn on the 
vagaries of the laws enacted by state legislators to address the completely separate matter 
of intestacy rights.  Only Congress has the authority to remedy this situation.  In 1965, 
Congress took action to remedy the inequity of relegating entitlement to survivor benefits 
to state intestacy laws by providing alternative means to qualify for such benefits.  I write 
separately in this case to urge that Congress take appropriate action now to correct the 
injustice resulting from application of legislative provisions that could not have 
contemplated this “new world” in which a father or mother may provide for a family 
even after his or her death.  Until Congress does so, courts will be constrained to sustain 
manifestly unfair results that deny survivor benefits based solely upon the domicile of the 
wage earner. 
